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Abstract: Focusing on Mexican cartels and affiliated drug trafficking organiza-
tions, this article examines how self-proclaimed cartel members use social media 
to further the criminal activities of their organizations. Employing an open-
source, intelligence-driven methodology, the authors identified, followed, and 
mapped the connections between and among 75 alleged cartel members over a 
period of 4 months. Results indicated that cartel members actively use Facebook 
to plan, organize, and communicate in real-time. These findings provide tenta-
tive validation to the utility of using open-source social media platforms to study 
the social structure and operations of Mexican drug cartels. Implications for law 
enforcement, homeland security, and the intelligence enterprise are discussed.
Keywords: drug trafficking organizations; Facebook; Mexican cartels; social 
media.
1  Introduction
The inception of organized crime dates back hundreds of years and has always 
been both a national and international problem. Be it Chinese Triads, Colombian 
cartels, Dominican criminal organizations, La Cosa Nostra (the Italian/Sicilian 
mafia), Japanese Yakuza, Korean criminal organizations, Mexican drug cartels, 
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Nigerian criminal organizations, the Russian mob, Vietnamese organized crime, 
or Yugoslavian/Albanian/Croatian/Serbian or “YACS” criminal enterprises, these 
criminal organizations have always presented a significant threat to society and 
challenge to law enforcement (Minogue 2000; Morrison 2002). While most of 
these organizations have been traditionally categorized by national origin or eth-
nicity, a more modern understanding of the transnational nature of their crimes 
suggests that a common language or culture only serves to limit our understand-
ing of their contemporary goals and techniques (Albanese 1996). Rather, the 
global nature of these transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) is now more 
broadly defined as “self-perpetuating associations of individuals who operate 
internationally for the purpose of obtaining power, influence, monetary and/or 
commercial gain, wholly or in part by illegal means, while protecting their activi-
ties through a pattern of corruption and/or violence”(USDOJ 2008).
A predominant type of TCO is a drug trafficking organization (DTO). In its 
National Drug Assessment, the U.S. Department of Justice defines DTOs as, 
“complex organizations with highly defined command-and-control structures 
that produce, transport, and distribute large quantities of one or more illicit 
drugs” (USDOJ 2010: p. 10). When acting in concert, DTOs may comprise drug 
cartels, which are large, highly sophisticated organizations composed of multiple 
DTOs and cells with specific assignments such as drug transportation, security/
enforcement, or money laundering. Drug cartel command-and-control structures 
are based outside the United States; however, they produce, transport, and dis-
tribute illicit drugs domestically with the assistance of DTOs that are either a part 
of or in an alliance with the foreign cartel (USDOJ 2010: p. 10).
Mexican cartels and DTOs have become a high priority for American law 
enforcement as the USDOJ (2010) describes them as “the greatest drug trafficking 
threat to the United States” (p. 9). The most recent intelligence on Mexican cartels 
and DTOs identifies eight major organizations, including the Sinaloa Cartel, Cartel 
Jalisco-New Generation (CJNG), La Familia Michoacana (LFM), Beltran Leyva-
organization (BLO), Los Zetas, Gulf Cartel, Juarez Cartel, and the Los Caballeros 
Templarios (DEA 2015). The Sinaloa Cartel is presently the most dominant DTO, 
controlling 40–60% of Mexico’s drug trade and earning approximately $3 billion 
in profits. It has a presence in 50 countries, operates in all regions of the United 
States, is highly cohesive, deals in cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, synthetic 
drugs and marijuana, and is widely considered to be “the most powerful mafia 
organization in the Western hemisphere” (Beitels 2015: p. 14).
This article focuses on Mexican drug cartels and their affiliated DTOs. Its 
purpose is to explore how self-identified cartel members may use social media 
to further the criminal activities of their organizations. It employs an open-
source, intelligence-driven methodology to systematically gather and analyze 
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information from the social media posts of alleged cartel members (Steele 2007). 
We begin with a brief review of the literature on the use of social media by TCOs, 
DTOs, and criminal street gangs. We then describe our data and research methods 
in detail before presenting the findings from our analysis. We conclude by dis-
cussing the implications of our findings for future researchers, law enforcement, 
and the homeland security enterprise.
2  Review of the Relevant Literature
In this section, we review empirical research findings on the use of technology, 
the Internet, and social media by TCOs, DTOs, and criminal street gangs. The 
research methodology adapted for this paper largely comes from this review of 
the literature and the gaps that it reveals.
2.1  Expliotation of Technology by Criminal Groups
Small and Taylor (2005) assert that despite a deeper and richer understand-
ing of transnational crime in the past few decades, the incidence and severity 
of crimes committed by these organizations is having a profound effect on the 
United States, mostly due to economic globalization, increasing numbers of 
immigrant groups in America and, significantly, the expansion and availabil-
ity of communication technology via the Internet. Criminal organizations have 
always sought to exploit technology for own their gain, but the availability of 
expansive bandwidth coupled with inexpensive and nimble wireless and mobile 
technologies has exponentially increased that capability (Choo 2008). Indeed, 
McCusker (2006) maintains that “cybercrime has become an integral part of the 
transnational threat landscape and conjures up pressing images of nefarious and 
increasingly complex online activities” (p. 257).
Still, we know relatively little about how these groups have incorporated 
modern technology into their criminal activities. Indeed, Decker and Pyrooz (2012) 
posited, “we simply don’t know how gang members use the Internet for criminal 
and noncriminal purposes and what can be done to respond to such use.” This 
dearth of knowledge represents a significant gap in our understanding of modern 
TCOs and DTOs. In 2007, King and colleagues reported that 45 percent of reported 
gang members used the Internet. In a more recent study, Decker and Pyrooz (2011) 
found that 82 percent of gang members in America have access to the Internet, and 
71 percent use social media platforms such as Facebook or MySpace.
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2.2  Social Media Use
The efforts that have been made thus far to explore this rapidly expanding use of 
technology are sparse and concentrate primarily on the use of social media. The 
predominant methodology thus far has been using key word searches on major 
social media outlets. For example, Morselli (2010) examined “cyberbanging” by 
way of a systematic keyword search that was restricted to the active users of the 
three primary vehicles for social networking (Facebook, MySpace and Twitter). 
He concluded that social networking sites did not actively recruit new members 
but rather provided a venue where individuals who may share gang values can 
congregate and legitimate those beliefs. Womer and Bunker (2010) explored 
social networking sites used by Mexican DTOs (specifically Surenos affiliates) 
and street gangs such as MS-13 and 18th street using keyword searches and also 
found that there was no active recruitment but rather a concerted effort to adver-
tise their power and danger by way of bragging about their criminal activities (e.g. 
posting photos of gun-toting members flashing gang signs). In order to assess the 
overall presence of gangs on social networking sites, Decary-Hetu and  Morselli 
(2011) conducted a keyword search on Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter using 
more than 50 street gang names and found that gangs have a large presence on 
social media sites (see also Morselli and Decary-Hetu 2013). Lastly, Patton (2015) 
used keyword searches on Twitter related to gang violence, crime and substance 
abuse to analyze 8.5 million tweets by known Detroit gang members and found 
four distinct ways gang members communicated in those areas, including griev-
ing the loss of a loved one, “beefing” or arguing online with gang rivals, display-
ing and discussing firearms, and displaying and discussing drugs and/or alcohol.
Although the extant research clearly favors keyword searches as a methodo-
logical tool for examining social networks, Wijeratne et  al. (2015) argue it has 
its limitations. A major drawback of these efforts are the authors’ decisions to 
identify social media posts by searching for those that satisfy a small list of key-
words related to violence, drugs, and weapons. Such filtering may significantly 
bias the topics and modes of use discovered. Consequently, Wijeratne et al. (2015) 
chose to study tweets collected on Twitter and analyze “specific gangs, oper-
ating in specific neighborhoods, in ways that may be useful to design specific 
judicial services” (p. 2). To do this, they used spatio-temporal-thematic analysis, 
 people-content-network-analysis, and emotion-sentiment analysis to assess neg-
ative community effects of gang activities, opinions of leaders who influence the 
thoughts and actions of gang members, the sentiments of posts targeting commu-
nities, and community and gang responses to community and support programs.
Taking a different methodological approach, Sela-Shayovits (2012) used 
a convenience sample of 30 gang members in Israel and employed in-depth, 
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semi-structured interviews to study online gang activity. Like previous studies, 
she found that Internet use does not promote the recruitment of members or 
gang formation but does play a considerable role in the socialization of members, 
particularly relating to their computer skills; computer savvy members train 
others who are less proficient, which results in more overall cyber deviance for 
the organization as a whole. Similarly, in an effort to assess online presence and 
criminality, Pyrooz et al. (2015) conducted 585 interviews of current and former 
gang members (n = 418) and also non-gang members in five cites Cleveland, 
Fresno, Los Angeles, Phoenix and St. Louis. Their findings indicate that (1) gang 
members use social media at the same, if not greater frequency, than non-gang 
members, (2) gang members commit online crime at a greater rate than non-gang 
members, and (3) the Internet is used by gang members for symbolic rather than 
instrumental purposes.
The current study builds upon this body of research by examining the use 
of social media by Mexican drug cartels and affiliated DTOs. Unlike much of the 
previous research on social media use by criminal gangs, our unit of analysis is 
the organizational member rather than keywords themselves. We used keyword 
searches only as an initial heuristic to identify potential cartel members who 
we then followed on Facebook over a period of 4 months. Moreover, instead of 
focusing on the use of social media for recruitment purposes, our efforts explore 
whether and to what extent members of TCOs or DTOs – principally Mexican drug 
cartels – used social media to plan, communicate, or otherwise facilitate their 
illicit activities. Specifically, we explore whether cartel members use social media 
primarily for symbolic purposes like Pyrooz et  al. (2015) found with domestic 
street gangs or whether they may also use social media for planning, command 
and control, and/or real-time communications in furtherance of their organiza-
tion’s criminal enterprise.
3  Data and Methods
The research methodology called for identifying potential TCO/DTO members on 
social media, systematically gathering information from their posts, and then 
analyzing the resulting data using descriptive, qualitative, and social network 
analytic techniques. Initially, keyword searches in English and Spanish were 
conducted on a variety of social media platforms (Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, 
etc.) using a mixture of cartel and drug-related search terms. Based on the sheer 
volume of “hits” on Facebook compared to the other social media platforms, the 
research team decided to focus its data collection efforts solely on the public 
Facebook pages of self-described cartel members.
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3.1  Level I Data Collection
Formal data collection began in August 2014 and continued through December 
2014, yielding approximately 4 months of data. Initially, Spanish-speaking research 
assistants (RAs) at The University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) conducted keyword 
searches on Facebook that contained a wide array of cartel and DTO-related search 
terms (e.g. marijuana, Sinaloa, weapon). These searches returned Facebook profiles 
of individuals who may be members of a Mexican cartel or DTO. A determination 
of whether to include a particular profile in the research sample was based on the 
following criteria: (1) self-admitted cartel or DTO criminal activity; (2) self-admitted 
membership to a cartel or DTO; (3) displays of recognizable cartel, gang, or DTO-
affiliated tattoos; (4) displays (usually photographs) of recognized gang and/or 
cartel symbols and signs; (5) posts concerning cross-border or international travel 
for the purpose of criminal behavior; (6) visual displays (e.g. photographs, maps) of 
transnational criminal activity; (7) photos depicting cartel or DTO criminal activity; 
or (8) any other evidence of being part of a cartel or DTO criminal hierarchy.
Because of IRB and researcher safety-related concerns, only public Face-
book pages were viewed and analyzed for markers of cartel or DTO affiliation. If 
an initial determination of cartel/DTO affiliation was made by an RA, the prin-
cipal investigator (PI) confirmed or denied the RA’s assessment. If both the RA 
and PI determined the individual to be a possible member of a cartel or DTO, 
the subject was assigned a code number, and his or her public Facebook profile 
was “observed” on Facebook on a weekly basis. During the observation period, 
non-personally identifiable information about the subject was entered into a 
password-protected Microsoft Word case observation form and eventually a 
password-protected SPSS database for subsequent analysis. This data consisted 
of demographic information (e.g. location and race) about the subject, cartel or 
DTO affiliation (e.g. cartel membership and specialized training), and behavioral 
information (e.g. spoke about gang activity) about the subject.
As described above, Level I data collection consisted of information that 
was posted for public viewing on Facebook. Although Level I observations 
required a Facebook account, they did not require formal invitations from 
the possible cartel/DTO members to access restricted portions (requiring the 
page owner’s permission) of their Facebook pages. In order to log onto Face-
book, members of the research team developed a group Facebook profile and 
account using a non-traceable email address.1 In accordance with Facebook 
1 In accordance with Facebook policy, the group account and profile were established using 
 authentic information. For safety purposes, only the first names of the RAs were used to establish 
the account. 
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policy and several federal courts, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
for information that is presented on an individuals’ public profile page.2 Any 
profiles that were blocked through Facebook settings were not recorded or 
observed. Further, researchers did not interact with the individuals observed, 
and they did not attempt to “friend” these individuals in order to gain entry 
into restricted access portions of their Facebook pages. If there was any elici-
tation from an individual to engage in communication, those requests were 
ignored.
3.2  Level II Data Collection
If an individual being observed granted further access into his or her profile 
without a formal request from a UTEP researcher, observations of the indi-
vidual continued without direct interaction. For example, if an individual 
“tagged” the RA account in a picture, this allowed the researcher to access 
the picture, which may have otherwise been inaccessible. UTEP researchers 
did not, however, make “friend” requests of the subjects they were observing 
or otherwise take affirmative steps to gain entry into private areas of subject 
profile pages.
Once all keyword searches were performed and the initial database of indi-
viduals observed was created, other potential DTO and cartel-affiliated sub-
jects were identified if they appeared on the pages of the originally identified 
members. That is, other individuals who corresponded with a suspected cartel 
or DTO member also had their profiles examined by an RA to see if the subject 
met the criteria for inclusion into the database and continued observation. The PI 
also confirmed inclusion of these individuals into the database. If these subjects 
merited observations, their data were recorded in the same, non-personally iden-
tifiable manner as the subjects in Phase I.
Secondary searches for linked subjects were performed on a weekly basis. 
Again, no affirmative steps were taken by the UTEP researchers to gain access 
to linked individuals’ restricted access pages. Data recorded from observations 
for all identified individuals continued as long as evidence of criminal activ-
ity remained and the information was publically accessible without invitation. 
All information that was gathered in Spanish was translated into English by a 
second RA.
2 Palmieri vs. United States, 2014 US. Dist. LEXIS 155613 (D. D.C. 2014); United States vs. Mere-
gildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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3.3  Data Analysis
Altogether, 75 potential cartel or DTO-affiliated individuals were identified and 
systematically observed on a weekly basis on Facebook over a 4 month period. 
All accounts were “active” during the entire observation period. Although not 
all 75 research subjects posted new material to their Facebook pages every 
week, most of them did. The amount of new, weekly information posted varied 
from subject to subject. Altogether, our observations yielded several 100 
case observation records (e.g. a new post, photograph, etc.) that were sub-
jected to analysis. Once data collection ended, quantitative, qualitative, and 
social network analyses were performed to identify how subjects made use 
of Facebook to assert their cartel/DTO affiliations, how they communicated 
with others, and how they were connected to one another. In addition, and 
as reported below, a descriptive statistical analysis was performed to examine 
the characteristics of identified individuals and their reported activity. In the 
Findings section below, we refer to research subjects by their assigned code 
numbers. Due to the sensitive and oftentimes overtly criminal nature of the 
information observed, all data were collected in a non-personally identifiable 
manner, and all subjects observed were assigned a unique code number for the 
purposes of analysis.
4  Findings
4.1  Evidence of Cartel/DTO Affiliation
As previously discussed, possible cartel/DTO affiliation was assessed inde-
pendently by two members of the research team applying at least one of eight 
criteria to the subjects’ profile pages for inclusion in the sample. Table 1 dis-
plays the number of individuals (and percentage of the sample) who fit each 
of the criteria outlined above. Nearly 90 percent of the individuals who were 
observed during the project self-admitted to being involved with a cartel or 
related cartel/DTO. Three-fourths of the sample had cartel symbols present 
somewhere on their social media profiles, while about two-thirds of the 
sample indicated they were part of a criminal hierarchy. Just over half of the 
sample (53%) self-admitted to being involved in some form of criminal activ-
ity. Evidence of international travel for criminal purposes was somewhat less 
prevalent, but a total of 30 individuals (40%) fit this criterion nonetheless. 
Twenty-eight individuals’ profiles (37%) provided evidence of transnational 
Brought to you by | University of Nebraska - Omaha
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/30/19 6:15 PM
The Use of Social Media by Alleged Members of Mexican Cartels      403
Table 1: Evidence of Criminal Organization Membership.
  Number   Percent
Self-admission to gang/cartel/TCO membership   67   89%
Cartel symbols evident   57   76%
Evidence of being part of criminal hierarchy   52   69%
Self-admission to criminal activity   40   53%
Evidence of international travel for criminal purpose  30   40%
Evidence of transnational criminal activity   28   37%
Original photo evidence of criminal activity   23   31%
Displays gang symbols/signs   21   28%
Gang tattoos   3   4%
criminal activity. Similarly, 23 individuals (31%) posted photos on their pro-
files that included evidence of criminal activity. It is worth mentioning that 
21 individuals (28%) posted original photographs of illegal drugs while five 
individuals posted original photographs of dead bodies and/or persons who 
had been tortured.3 Twenty-one individuals (28%) displayed gang symbols/
signs on their profiles. The presentation of tattoos was the least common mode 
of cartel/DTO self-identification through social media – only three individuals 
met this criterion.
To illustrate, subject AFB004’s Facebook page contained pictures of dead 
bodies, tortured victims, drugs, cartel symbols, and large sums of money. He is 
a male who claims to be a member of Cartel de Sinaloa and indicates he trained 
at the Antrax School. He claims to currently live in Tamaulipas, Mexico. The “Los 
Antrax” group is described as the designated enforcers and the tactical security 
force of the Sinaloa Cartel. The group was led by the drug lords Jesus Pena and 
Rodrigo Arechiga Gamboa (El Chino Antrax)4 who are responsible for a number of 
homicides and for providing armed security services to Ismael El Mayo Zambada. 
The group operates in the State of Sinaloa where it is largely rumored to have a 
“training academy” referred to as the School of Antrax where paramilitary style 
boot camp training is conducted for new recruits (Sinaloa Cartel’s Top Enforcer 
2015).
3  “Original” photos survived scrutiny. All photos were searched for on Facebook, googled, and 
in general searched for online to ensure that they were not simply tagged or copied by the indi-
vidual Facebook owner.
4 Interestingly, Gamboa allegedly was caught by the DEA because of his social media postings 
on Instagram.
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4.2  Sample Demographics
A total of 56 individuals included their ages on their social media profiles. The 
youngest individual was 14 years old while the oldest was 45. The average age of 
the sample was 26.8. In terms of race, the sample was overwhelmingly Hispanic. 
Of the 67 individuals who provided their race/ethnicity, only two identified them-
selves as being Caucasian while the remaining individuals identified as Hispanic. 
Finally, in terms of gender, the sample was predominantly male: 67 subjects were 
males and eight were females.
4.2.1  Cartel Affiliation
Bearing in mind that several individuals reported being affiliated with more 
than one cartel or group,5 most of the sample (n = 56) reported affiliation with 
Cartel de Sinaloa (CDS). Of those reporting CDS affiliation, 46 also indicated 
being involved in some way with Antrax, while six indicated being affiliated 
with Mayo Zambada. Zetas-affiliated individuals were the next most repre-
sented cartel: 18 individuals reported association with this group. While the 
majority of individuals classified themselves as either CDS or Zetas, 13 individu-
als reported affiliation to one of five other groups: Gente Nueva, Cartel de Golfo, 
Cartel de Jalisco, Cartel de Pacifico, and Viajes Carrillo. It is also worth noting 
that of the eight females in the sample, six reported affiliation with CDS (five of 
who also reported being affiliated with Antrax) and two reported connections 
to Zetas.
The DEA’s most recent, unclassified assessment of the major drug traffick-
ing organizations in Mexico asserts that there are eight major cartels operating 
in the country (DEA 2015). The largest and most powerful of the cartels is Cartel 
de Sinaloa, which makes up the majority of the individuals in the sample (77% 
including its affiliates Antrax and Mayo Zambada). While Los Zetas have frag-
mented and lost key members to death or arrest, they continue to operate as a 
series of splinter groups and control significant portions of the drug trade along 
the Mexican Gulf coast. It is interesting to note that our sample contained only 
one self-identified member of the Cartel de Jalisco or New Generation Jalisco 
Cartel, which is the fastest growing and perhaps second most powerful cartel in 
Mexico (Bender 2015; DEA 2015).
5 For example, five individuals reported being members of both Cartel de Sinaloa and Gente 
Nueva.
Brought to you by | University of Nebraska - Omaha
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/30/19 6:15 PM
The Use of Social Media by Alleged Members of Mexican Cartels      405
4.2.2  Rank or Occupation in Cartel/DTO
Roughly 63 percent of the individuals in the sample (n = 47) indicated their rank 
or occupation within their identified criminal organization.6 The modal job 
description listed by each of these 47 individuals within their cartels is reported 
in Table 2. Within almost all of the cartels represented in the sample, the most 
common role reported was being a commander or holding some other type 
of leadership role. In addition, 16 individuals reported having a job descrip-
tion that fell under “Operations Support” (e.g. AFB031 claimed to be a “body 
disposer”). Eight individuals fell into the “Tactical Support” category. Eleven 
individuals claimed to be “sicarios” or “hit-men” who upon given the order by 
cartel leadership will eliminate specified targets, which may include identified 
snitches, cartel rivals, law enforcement members, public officials, etc., while two 
individuals reported being recruiters for the Zetas. Of the eight females in the 
sample, only two indicated their occupation: one reported having an Operations 
Table 2: Descriptive Data on Membership, Age, Gender, Rank, and Travel.
Cartel Affiliation   No. of 
Members
  Mean 
Age
  Percent 
Male
  Modal Rank/
Occupation
  Percent Traveled 
to US
Sinaloa   56  27.6  89.0  Command/
leadership
  42.9
Antrax   46  27.5  89.0  Command/
leadership
  41.3
Mayo Zambada   6  24.2  100.0  Command/
leadership and 
operations 
support
  33.3
Zetas   18  24.5  89.0  Command/
leadership and 
enforcer
  11.1
Gente Nueva   6  28.6  100.0  Command/
leadership
  83.3
Cartel de Golfo   4  25.0  75.0  Command/
leadership and 
operations
  75.0
Cartel de Jalisco   1  –  100.0  Tactical   0.0
Cartel de Pacifico  1  –  100.0  –   –
Viajos Carrillo   1  –  100.0  Enforcer   –
6 Subject DFB004 suggests on his Facebook page that he works for Customs and Border Protection.
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Support role, while the other claimed to be a Recruiter for the Zetas. In most 
cases, the subjects reported fulfilling an identifiable role within the hierarchy of 
their organization.
4.2.3  Residence and Travel
Most of the individuals in the sample included their current locations on their 
social media profiles. The majority were based in either Mexico (n = 48) or the 
United States (n = 17); however, two individuals claimed to be located in  Colombia 
and Norway, respectively. There is also evidence that some of the individuals 
frequently cross the United States-Mexico border. Subject AFB025, for example, 
reported that he resided in Sinaloa but claimed to have traveled to Tucson and 
Phoenix, Arizona; Las Vegas, Nevada, and San Diego, San Jose, Santa Ana, and 
Los Angeles, California. On the other hand, subject AFB006 indicated that he was 
residing in El Paso, Texas but had recently visited Ciudad Victoria, Mazatlán, and 
Badiraguato.
As shown in Table 2, the research team was able to document places that 38 
individuals (50 percent of the sample) recently visited either before or during 
the course of the project. Altogether, these 38 individuals claim to have visited 
no less than 138 different cities worldwide within the last 2 years. On average, 
individuals indicated traveling to roughly six unique cities, although subject 
FB008 reported traveling to 24 different cities in Mexico, the United States, 
Italy, and China between 2012 and 2014. The top three destinations of choice 
were Culiacán, Mexico; Los Angeles; and Guadalajara. Each of these cities was 
visited by at least 10 of the individuals in the sample. Mazatlán, Las Vegas, 
Phoenix, San Diego, and Tijuana each attracted between six and nine individu-
als from the sample.
Interestingly, only 2 of the 18 Zetas indicated traveling anywhere on their 
Facebook profiles. This was in stark contrast to the members of Cartel de 
Sinaloa: 35 of the 56 members (or 63%) indicated places they had recently trav-
elled on their profiles. This could mean that the Zetas either (1) travel less or 
(2) are more secretive about their travel. Of course, it is also possible that this 
difference is merely an artifact of our sampling procedure (i.e. it was by chance 
that the 18 Zetas we monitored did not discuss travel on their profiles). These 
data, as well as the current residence of the subjects (above), provide evidence 
of the inter- and intra-national nature of cartels/DTOs. Frequent travel to carry 
out their criminal organization’s business was a common theme among the 
research subjects.
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4.3  Network Relationship
In the next step of the analysis, we used social network analytic techniques (SNA) 
to explore the relationships among the 75 research subjects.7 SNA focuses on the 
relationships among social entities rather than the entities themselves and is 
used extensively in the social sciences (Scott 2013). SNA is used here to uncover 
relationships between the 75 individuals in the sample and to visually depict how 
they were connected to each other and to the cartels represented in the sample. 
For each individual in the sample, a list of affiliates was generated based on the 
individual’s Facebook friends. Sixty-two individuals had at least one other person 
from the sample in their Facebook friends list. The number of affiliates listed 
ranged from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 12.
4.4  Cartel/DTO Affiliation by Network
In the analyses that follow, social network analysis is used to visually depict cartel 
affiliation. This allows for the identification of subjects who belong to or are affili-
ated with multiple cartels. In Figure 1, a line is drawn from each individual in the 
sample to the cartel(s) with which s/he claims affiliation. Figure 1 clearly shows 
that none of the individuals claiming to be Zetas report being affiliated with any 
other cartel. However, most, but not all, members reporting Cartel de Sinaloa 
affiliation also report being affiliated with Viruz Antrax (see Figure 2). The lone 
member of Viajos Carrillos – FB025 – also reports being affiliated with both Cartel 
de Sinaloa and Antrax. Similarly, AFB002 is the only individual who reported 
Cartel de Jalisco affiliation, but he also indicates being affiliated with Cartel de 
Sinaloa and Antrax. Cartel de Golfo has four individuals reporting affiliation in 
the present sample – AFB025, AFB031, FB003, and FB007. Each of these four indi-
viduals also report affiliation with Cartel de Sinaloa and Antrax. AFB031 further 
indicates affiliation with Mayo Zambada. Gente Nueva has six members reporting 
affiliation in the sample. Four of them – AFB004, AFB005, FB009, and JFB009 – 
claim to also affiliate with Cartel de Sinaloa and Antrax. FB009 further indicates 
7 Note that a group Facebook page for Antrax run by subject FB011 was included in the social 
network analyses and was assigned subject code number FB010. FB010 was not included in any 
of the preceding analyses but it was associated through SNA with a number of individuals in the 
sample. In addition, five individuals appear in the social network analyses who were not part of 
the sample – NFB001, NFB002, NFB003, NFB004, and NFB005. Nothing is known about these 
individuals other than they are associates of JFB009. They were mentioned on JFB009’s Face-
book page, but we were unable to locate their Facebook pages if indeed they maintained them.
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Figure 1: Cartel Affiliations.
belonging to Mayo Zambada.  One individual affiliated with Gente Nueva – FB018 – 
reports affiliation with Cartel de Sinaloa, but not Antrax.
Six individuals from the sample indicate affiliation with Mayo Zambada. Of 
these six individuals, five of them (AFB031, FB001, FB009, FB022, and FB026) 
also report affiliation with Cartel de Sinaloa and Antrax. FB009 is also affiliated 
with Gente Nueva, while AFB031 is also affiliated with Cartel de Golfo. All four 
individuals connected to Cartel de Golfo – AFB025, AFB031, FB003, and FB007 – 
also report being affiliated with Cartel de Sinaloa and Antrax (as previously men-
tioned, AFB031 is also affiliated with Mayo Zambada). Finally, FB021 is the lone 
individual connected to Cartel de Pacifico, and he is not affiliated with any of the 
other cartels.
The individual connections to various cartels and the relationships among 
them uncovered by the social network analysis align with what is generally known 
about Mexican drug cartels today. The Zetas were once the military enforcement 
wing of Cartel de Golfo (Gulf Cartel) much like Antrax is the present day enforce-
ment arm of Cartel de Sinaloa. In the early 2000s, the Zetas broke away from the 
Gulf Cartel and struck out on their own. Today, they are part of a faction of cartels 
that is at war with the Sinaloa Cartel and its allies, including the Gulf Cartel and 
the Knights Templar Cartel (Zetas 2015). Thus, it is not surprising that the social 
network analysis found no relationship between Zetas affiliates and Sinaloa/
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Antrax affiliates, but it adds credibility to the likelihood that the individuals rep-
resented in the sample are indeed who they claim to be – members of Mexico’s 
drug cartels. The patterns of associations found in the social network analy-
sis confirm alliances between the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel, Gente Nueva 
(another enforcement wing of Cartel de Sinaloa), and followers of Mayo Zambada 
(“El May”) who is reported to have taken over leadership of the Cartel de Sinaloa 
following “El Chapo” Guzman’s arrest in February 2014 (Gagne 2015).
4.5  Communications
The underlying purpose of social media is the development and/or maintenance 
of social relationships, which is partially illustrated by the “friend” ties that 
are the basis of the social network analysis above. Evidence of these relation-
ships was abundant on the Facebook pages of the subjects in the sample and 
Figure 2: Close-Up of Cartel de Sinaloa and Antrax.
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included communication between network associates or “friends.” As some 
of the examples below illustrate, such communication can be statements for 
general consumption that brag about illegal activities and conquests or that 
carry direct or indirect threats or assertions of retaliation. In addition, some of 
the  cartel-affiliated members captured in this study also communicated about 
travel activity and other actions that have possible connection to criminal activity 
that can be deemed tactical communication.
FB008 is an example. He is a male who lives in Jalisco, Sinaloa and had the 
highest eigenvector score of the sample. He has nine associates – FB001, FB002, 
FB006, FB009, FB011, FB012, FB013, FB016, and FB017 – and is a member of the 
Antrax group Facebook page (FB010). He acclaims to be a tactical commander 
and uses Facebook to provide direct reports to his group. He communicates 
threats and promotes his organization’s efforts. He also uses Facebook to call 
group meetings. Below are some examples of FB008’s usage of Facebook. Direct 
quotations were translated from Spanish and are italicized and enclosed in quo-
tation marks; words in brackets were added to provide context:
FB008 – (caption beneath a photo of two guns) “preparing the toys to go out hunting thieves 
and imposters. I didn’t want to arrive to this, but they wanted to come disturb the territories 
of my [FB011] MI R_1 this is something that we’ll never permit. Arm yourselves [Antrax] since 
this is the hour of action that our toys should be ready.”
FB008 – “Here from a distance my trucks are ready to act on ‘the voice of command’ of my 
[FB011]. Today, while waking up I was going to go with ‘La Reyna’, but as I was arriving the 
‘Contras’ and government recognized me because I’m the son-in-law and supporter of the 
‘Senior’. You’ll see the apocalypse and you’ll know why we are the best of Antrax.”
FB008 – “Good afternoon my [FB011], for those people who are sending messages to the 
queen, asking for jobs, money, or sending insults know that I read everything of hers. I tell 
people who is in charge of giving jobs, doing jobs, and moving their people. It’s me and always 
has been. I ask that you abstain from doing that, we do not contract, we are not an agency, and 
even less by this medium when I receive orders from [FB011] MI R_1. I need people myself, I 
call looking or to contract, but this medium we utilize for being close to the people we appreci-
ate. We love our Antrax friends, but there are people who ask for jobs. To our people we have 
enough jobs around the world in service to CDS [Cartel de Sinaloa] to only people from Antrax, 
and no one else. We vacation a lot, and this is the medium that we utilize to remain close to you 
all that we like. Have an excellent afternoon, and send me a message if you have a problem.”
FB028 provides another example of how members of the sample communi-
cated through Facebook. FB028 is a male who claims to be a member of CDS 
and who is also affiliated with Viruz de Antrax. He currently resides in Sinaloa 
and has five associates – FB006, FB007, FB011, JFB001, and JFB007. Although 
his eigenvector score is not in the top 15 within the sample, he is connected to 
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very central  individuals like FB011 and FB006. FB028 seemingly uses Facebook 
as a tool to coordinate operations in real-time. He posts about coordinating ship-
ments arriving from Colombia as well as coordinating escorts and security for 
the shipments on the highway. He provides updates of movements and locations 
and seeks updates on locations and movements of rival DTOs. He even provided 
some insight on a tactic used to transport a shipment and avoid opposition and/
or detection: His people posed as a Mexican Marine convoy. The following posts 
(translated to English) were made by FB028 in November 2014:
FB028: “We left Sinaloa, in a cheap truck-we were going to beat the shit of some narcos in 
Michoacan-it was an adjustment of accounts in the style of Sinaloa who managed it-they believe 
themselves firm/tough-once we arrive [Uruapan] we will quickly put them in the ground.”
FB028: “JR’s we have the presence of 28/89 “ZTA” in the Sinaloa-my people already have 
them-they were on course on 55 north through the freeway 77 K S-they were to detour through 
the 93/89-I will send them an alert that we continue on the 85-we are going to transfer to 
12/36/36….”
FB028: “The gang really charged up-taking care of the mountain range with the medium sized 
AK-47-always really ready-waiting for 12/78…gang is pending 7-7…”
FB028 – “GN [likely Gente Nueva], GAA [cell], GB [cell] and A.AC [cell] are prepared for 
November. there will be a ghost operative implemented. There’s an important 4-59 [likely an 
escort] in Sinaloa….pure people of high class/influence will be present. Security by air and 
land.”
FB028 – “We keep cleaning Baja California of the Zetas. Here is proof of it. Me the 7-7 [code 
name] and my C.D.S. [Sinaloa Cartel], GN [Gente Nueva], and the Antrax, we don’t charge 
taxes/tolls. I send you this brief statement; to the people of those establishments that pay 
taxes/tolls, will be qualified as Zetas. We don’t kidnap or steal. We don’t extortionate and we 
don’t rape like the dogs the Zetas. This statement goes for Z-65 [Zeta cartel code name]; look 
here bastard don’t send __ to throw the heads of my people in Sinaloa. If you have balls, come 
throw them personally yourself and you’ll bump into me and I’m going to teach you how to 
work in the Sinaloa. Style. This goes for you Z-65 and your dogs the Zetas. Sincerely 7-7, El Jr 
[Alias] from C.D.S. [Sinaloa Cartel]. I don’t go around with bullshit.”
Others – “Here we are, at the order Sir.”
FB028 – “To the fullest friend/subordinate Garcia …..awesome to the fight friend/subordi-
nate. Prepare yourself to receive orders 4 52- [possibly people listening in on the communica-
tion] 1036 [likely -appointment exact hour/time] MZ [very likely Mayo Zambada] JR [alias,] 
7-7 [code name].”
Others 1 – “Ready 10-4 [Roger/confirmed] and a 111 [unknown but appears to be a greeting or 
shout out] to all the comrades/subordinates that are out fighting.”
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JFB006 provides a final example of how Facebook is used by alleged cartel/DTO 
members in the sample. JFB006 is ranked 30th in the sample in terms of eigen-
vector centrality and has four associates: FB0012, FB015, FB018, and FB022. 
At first glance, he might not appear to be central to this network; however, his 
communications on Facebook suggest otherwise. He is a male living somewhere 
in Guadalajara. He refers to himself as the “Jefe de Jefes” and is affiliated with 
Viruz de Antrax. He uses Facebook to communicate real-time movements, track 
the opposition, and provide updates to his unit. Below are a few examples of his 
communications:
JFB006 – “I want maximum alert-convoy of four SUVs-An offering-the female dog of the Zetas 
is leading the convoy-Locate the point in which the convoy is traveling X street to Jalisco-I 
have no locations-I need all the point people/hawks and zone bosses activated and working 
immediately-I do not want you in Jalisco-my armament ready-I will be out to check everything-
Sincerely Commander.”
JFB006 – “I want real information, I’m getting rumors that the Zetas are by Tala [City in 
Mexico] and around the area contracting and killing whoever. My team is gathering intel-
ligence, but the dogs [Zetas] are smelling them out. I’m occupying ‘Gente Nueva’ just decide 
and know why you are going. It’s for Jalisco… Come into file here [Fall in].”
JFB006 – “My Antrax hawks… report yourselves and say who wants to be part of my group. 
Let’s see who has them [balls] to prove themselves, but you have to do what is ordered 
without questioning orders, and respect civilians and children, we take care of them. I have 
only 20 spaces in Tala [City in Mexico] and surrounding lands, where Zetas are present 
and killing kids in discos [dance club]. Who is interested in jamming them with bullets and 
knives?”
The many Facebook posts that we observed during the course of the data collec-
tion period provide compelling evidence that Mexica cartel members and affili-
ated cartel/DTO members regularly use Facebook for a variety of purposes. This 
social medium is used as a platform to boast of accomplishments, assert power, 
and threaten rivals. In that sense, it serves its intended purpose of promoting 
social connectedness and group cohesion. Beyond that, those in the sample who 
identified themselves as commanders or other types of leaders in their organiza-
tions used Facebook to plan, communicate, and provide direction to their sub-
ordinates. They frequently used code words, phrases, or numbers in an effort to 
conceal from outsiders the meaning of their posts, and they did this again and 
again over the course of 4 months of data collection. Again, this suggests that 
the Facebook activity we observed was genuine and reflected the contemporane-
ous communications of cartel/DTO members who made use of a common social 
media platform to further their criminal enterprise.
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5  Discussion and Conclusion
This study sought to advance our understanding of how TCOs and DTOs may 
be using social media to communicate and further their criminal activities. We 
employed an open-source, intelligence-driven methodology to identify and 
explore the nature and extent of social media use by individuals who claim affili-
ation with TCOs/DTOs, and in particular, Mexican drug cartels and their affiliated 
gangs. We then used social network analytic techniques to identify the relation-
ships among the sample of 75 people included in the study and the groups with 
which they claimed affiliation. Finally, we employed an open-coding, qualitative 
analysis strategy to examine how members in the sample communicated with 
each other and the dominant themes in their communications.
The sample that we identified and observed was not necessarily representa-
tive of cartel activity on Facebook. Rather, it was a convenience sample used to 
explore the efficacy of using publicly-facing Facebook pages for identifying and 
observing the online behavior of self-identified members of Mexican drug traf-
ficking organizations. Additional research in this area is needed to further under-
stand the behavior of cartel members on social media and to validate their use of 
these platforms to further their criminal activities.
With these limitations in mind, our results provide evidence that Mexican 
cartel members are actively using Facebook to communicate and carry out the 
business of their organizations. While our research protocol did not permit us 
to independently verify the identities and affiliations of those in the sample, the 
Facebook data themselves suggest that the persons we followed for more than 
120 days were most likely the genuine article. They used words, phrases, jargon, 
and geographic references (often in code) suggestive of insider knowledge of 
cartel operations. In addition, their self-described group affiliations and the con-
nections (or sometimes lack thereof) between groups align with what is currently 
known about cartel factions in Mexico from media reports both in Mexico and 
the United States. The Zetas, for example, were completely unaffiliated with the 
Sinaloa Cartel and its associated gangs, which is precisely what one would expect 
to find using more direct intelligence gathering methods.
These findings provide at least tentative validation of the utility of using 
open-source social media platforms to examine the social structure and opera-
tions of Mexican drug cartels. This has implications for researchers who seek to 
study the cartels from a social discourse and social-structural perspective, and it 
has implications for law enforcement and intelligence professionals who seek to 
understand, track, and ultimately disrupt the illicit activities of the cartels. The 
methodology we used was relatively low-cost and low-risk and could be adapted 
for a variety of research and intelligence-gathering purposes.
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The Department of Homeland Security’s fiscal years 2014–2018 strategic plan 
is built on the foundation of a multi-layered risk-based security approach that 
aims at reducing vulnerabilities. The department has made an analytical agenda 
the centerpiece of their strategic plan. The aim of the analytical agenda is to 
improve data collection and analysis capabilities in order to increase the capac-
ity to consistently assess strategic and external risk to the United States (USDHS 
2014). Analytic processes that aid in supporting analytically-informed decision-
making across DHS missions seem to be highly valued within the homeland secu-
rity enterprise. Although the idea of “Big data” is the big prize that the department 
seeks, this research project did not intend to address “Big data” issues.
The results of this research project tell us that transnational criminal organi-
zations in Mexico utilize, with uncanny openness, social media platforms to 
conduct illicit activity. The implication for homeland security enterprise intelli-
gence professionals is that social media platforms have the potential to assist in 
uncovering patterns and faint signals of risk through enhanced data integration 
and analysis. In other words, there is the possibility that this type of research 
can aid in the development of a tool that has multi-layer characteristics for data 
collection and analysis. As stated previously this research project did not solve or 
uncover ‘big data’ issues but it did provide an insight into a growing niche of the 
criminal enterprise.
Historically, Homeland Security Investigators have not utilized open source 
social media platforms as a primary queuing system to understand transnational 
criminal organizations in developing a criminal case (White 2011). The results of 
this research project indicate that there is an opportunity to reverse the typical 
model of investigating transnational criminal organizations. This type of work 
has the possibility to increase efficiencies in identifying and understanding 
the hierarchal structure of criminal organizations. Furthermore, a peripheral 
outcome of this research project seems to suggest that by beginning with social 
media platforms Homeland Security Investigators have the potential to improve 
the decision-making process on where to direct their resources. This becomes 
important when the aim is to reduce risk by developing strategies that refine and 
focus targeting efforts to mitigate threats to the homeland.
These findings also have implications for state and local law enforcement 
and fall in line with a relatively recent movement among these agencies toward 
the utilization of social media. A 2015 survey conducted by the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) found that 96% of responding agencies 
reported using social media in some capacity (IACP N.D.). More specifically, 
almost 90% of agencies reported using social media to support investigations and 
75% reported using it for intelligence activity. These efforts increase the capacity 
of law enforcement agencies to collect evidence, locate suspects, and monitor 
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and identify criminal networks (COPS Office 2013). The most common focus of 
these efforts has been cyberbullying and recruitment toward violent extremism 
(IACP 2010, 2014). The findings from the present study illustrate that presence of 
TCOs and DTOs on social media is another realm of organized criminal activity 
on the Internet that can be exploited to gain intelligence gathered through open 
source data collection, which is critical for state and local law enforcement agen-
cies that are typically under resourced for intelligence collection efforts relative 
to their federal counterparts.
While these findings highlight the potential utility for social media as an 
open-source intelligence tool to monitor TCOs/DTOs for the Homeland Security 
enterprise that includes state and local law enforcement, they are also accompa-
nied by practical challenges for implementation. Like other new technological 
areas in the intelligence sphere, developing a social media intelligence capacity 
will require the hiring and training of skilled personnel, which may be difficult 
in resource challenged state and local agencies. A more plausible model for these 
agencies to utilize this capacity may lie in collaboration with their state and local 
intelligence fusion centers who have developed this intelligence capacity. Even 
when these personnel capacity issues are addressed, it also has to be recognized 
that this intelligence source is not a panacea for developing a means to accurately 
monitor the activity of TCOs/DTOs. Noting the potential issues of false informa-
tion in social media sources, law enforcement investigators working in this area 
stress the importance of verifying and authenticating data through suspect con-
fessions, witness statements, IP address authentication, and other techniques 
(Keenen et al. 2013). Such efforts may be difficult for law enforcement and secu-
rity agencies in the case TCOs and DTOs members who are engaged in activities 
outside the United States. An additional important consideration paralleling 
these verification and authentication protocols is also the development of proper 
policies and procedures on social media intelligence data collection that operate 
within legal standards (Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative 2013).
Finally, this study also has implications for conducting research on criminal 
activity using social media platforms. When law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies are utilizing social media for open source data collection, the privacy 
considerations do not have the same relevance as they do in the research commu-
nity. In essence, in the law enforcement and intelligence context, the collection 
of social media data by means that thwart user privacy efforts is equivalent to 
conducting an undercover operation within certain procedural limits. However, 
collecting data in a research context requires more sensitivity to the require-
ments of informed consent, boundaries to collection in relation to privacy set-
tings, and anonymity (Zimmer 2010). Careful consider was given to these issues 
in the present study, resulting in the decision to only use public data not behind 
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privacy settings. Scholars have raised the concern that such an approach may 
limit the access to data and thereby the utility of the resulting analysis (Giglietto 
et al. 2012). However, research suggests that many users are not stringent in their 
use of privacy settings and provide a considerable amount of information on the 
public side of these settings (Wilson et al. 2012). The findings of the present study 
are in line with this prior research. Individuals reportedly engaged with TCO/
DTOs do present a considerable amount of personal information on the public 
side of Facebook, which illustrates that social media research, at a minimum, is a 
valuable tool for exploratory research on these organizations.
Funding: Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, 
Office of University Programs (Grant/Award Number: 2008-ST-061-BS0001-06).
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